Section: New Results

Verification of Security Protocols in the Symbolic Model

Participants : Bruno Blanchet, Miriam Paiola, Robert Künnemann.

Miriam Paiola wrote and defended her PhD thesis on the verification of security protocols with lists [45] .

Robert Künnemann published a paper at the IEEE S&P conference on how to extend symbolic cryptographic protocol verifiers to account for global state [60] .

Bruno Blanchet published a tutorial on the protocol verifier ProVerif  [66] , as a follow-up to his teaching in the FOSAD'13 summer school last year.

The applied pi calculus is a widely used language for modeling security protocols, including as a theoretical basis of ProVerif . However, the seminal paper that describes this language (Abadi and Fournet, POPL'01) does not come with proofs, and detailed proofs for the results in this paper were never published. This year, Martin Abadi, Bruno Blanchet, and Cedric Fournet wrote detailed proofs for the main theorems of this paper. This work was also an opportunity to fix a few minor details in the results and to tune the calculus to improve it and make it closer to the input calculus of ProVerif . We plan to submit this work as a journal paper.