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Section: New Software and Platforms
ProVerif
Keywords: Security - Verification - Cryptographic protocol
Functional Description: ProVerif is an automatic security protocol verifier in the symbolic model (so called Dolev-Yao model). In this model, cryptographic primitives are considered as black boxes. This protocol verifier is based on an abstract representation of the protocol by Horn clauses. Its main features are:
It can verify various security properties (secrecy, authentication, process equivalences).
It can handle many different cryptographic primitives, specified as rewrite rules or as equations.
It can handle an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol (even in parallel) and an unbounded message space.
News Of The Year: Marc Sylvestre improved the display of attacks, in particular by showing the computations performed by the attacker to obtain the messages sent in the attack, and by explaining why the found trace breaks the considered security property. He also developed an interactive simulator that allows the user to run the protocol step by step. We also made several case studies using this tool (Signal, TLS 1.3 Draft 18, ARINC 823 avionic protocol).
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Participants: Bruno Blanchet, Marc Sylvestre and Vincent Cheval
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Publications: Automated Reasoning for Equivalences in the Applied Pi Calculus with Barriers - Automated reasoning for equivalences in the applied pi calculus with barriers - Modeling and Verifying Security Protocols with the Applied Pi Calculus and ProVerif - Automatic Verification of Security Protocols in the Symbolic Model: The Verifier ProVerif - Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate - Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate - Automated Verification for Secure Messaging Protocols and Their Implementations: A Symbolic and Computational Approach - Symbolic and Computational Mechanized Verification of the ARINC823 Avionic Protocols - Symbolic and Computational Mechanized Verification of the ARINC823 Avionic Protocols