Section: New Results

Symmetric cryptology

Participants : Xavier Bonnetain, Christina Boura, Anne Canteaut, Daniel Coggia, Pascale Charpin, Daniel Coggia, Gaëtan Leurent, María Naya Plasencia, Léo Perrin, André Schrottenloher, Ferdinand Sibleyras.

• Design of Saturnin a new lightweight block cipher for authenticated encryption [74], which is resistant to quantum cryptanalysis. Saturnin has been submitted to the NIST competition for lightweight cryptography, and has been selected for the 2nd round of the competition (https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/lightweight-cryptography/documents/round-2/spec-doc-rnd2/saturnin-spec-round2.pdf).

• Mixture-differential distinguishers on AES-like ciphers [18].

• Cryptanalysis of the Sbox of the Russian standards, Streebog and Kuznyechik [31], [56]. This work by L. Perrin received the best paper award at FSE 2019. Moreover, L. Perrin has been invited to present his results to AFNOR. He is involved in the international standardization processes in symmetric cryptography [50], [86] and has been invited to ISO meetings on this topic.

• The work on the Streebog Sbox has led to a more general study on tools for quantifying anomalies in Sboxes [44].

• Design of Bison , the first concrete block cipher following the whitened swap-or-not construction [46].

• Chosen-prefix collision attack on SHA-1 [52]: A chosen-prefix collision attack is a stronger variant of a collision attack, where an arbitrary pair of challenge prefixes are turned into a collision. Chosen-prefix collisions are usually significantly harder to produce than (identical-prefix) collisions, but the practical impact of such an attack is much larger. G. Leurent and T. Peyrin proposed new techniques to turn collision attacks into chosen-prefix collision attacks, and present such an attack against SHA-1 with complexity between $2^{66.9}$ and $2^{69.4}$ (depending on assumptions about the cost of finding near-collision blocks).

• Design of lighweight MACs from universal hash functions [51]. Many constructions of MACs used in practice (such as GMAC or Poly1305-AES) follow the Wegman-Carter-Shoup construction, which is only secure up to $2^{64}$ queries with a 128-bit state. S. Duval and G. Leurent proposed new constructions to reach security beyond the birthday bound, and proposed a concrete instantiation, with very good performances on ARM micro-controllers.

• Differential Equivalence of Sboxes: C. Boura, A. Canteaut and their co-authors have studied two notions of differential equivalence of Sboxes corresponding to the case when the functions have the same difference table, or when their difference tables have the same support [19]. They proved that these two notions do not coincide, and that they are invariant under some classical equivalence relations like EA and CCZ equivalence. They also proposed an algorithm for determining the whole equivalence class of a given function.

• Boomerang Uniformity of Sboxes: The boomerang attack is a cryptanalysis technique against block ciphers which combines two differentials for the upper part and the lower part of the cipher. The Boomerang Connectivity Table (BCT) is a tool introduced by Cid et al. at Eurocrypt 2018 for analysing the dependency between these two differentials. C. Boura and A. Canteaut have provided an in-depth analysis of BCT, by studying more closely differentially 4-uniform Sboxes. More recently, C. Boura, L. Perrin and S. Tian have obtained new results on the boomerang uniformity of several constructions of Sboxes [57].

• CCZ equivalence of Sboxes: A. Canteaut and L. Perrin have characterized CCZ-equivalence as a property of the zeroes in the Walsh spectrum of an Sbox (or equivalently in their DDT). They used this framework to show how to efficiently upper bound the number of distinct EA-equivalence classes in a given CCZ-equivalence class. More importantly, they proved that CCZ-equivalence can be reduced to the association of EA-equivalence and an operation called twisting. They then revisited several results from the literature on CCZ-equivalence and showed how they can be interpreted in light of this new framework [21], [58].

• Links between linear and differential properties of Sboxes: P. Charpin together with J. Peng has established new links between the differential uniformity and the nonlinearity of some Sboxes in the case of two-valued functions and quadratic functions. More precisely, they have exhibited a lower bound on the nonlinearity of monomial permutations depending on their differential uniformity, as well as an upper bound in the case of differentially two-valued functions [27]

• Study of the properties of the error-correcting codes associated to differentially 4-uniform Sboxes [26]. Most notably, this work analyzes the relationship between the number of low-weight codewords and the nonlinearity of the corresponding Sbox.

• Study of crooked and weakly-crooked functions [35]: Crooked functions form a family of APN functions whose derivaties take they values in an (affine) hyperplane.

• APN functions with the butterfly construction [22], [34]: the butterfly construction, originally introduced by Perrin et al., is a general construction which includes the only known example of APN permutation operating on an even number of variables. A. Canteaut, L. Perrin and S. Tian have proved that the most recent generalization of this construction does not include any other APN function when the number of variables exceeds six.

• Low-memory attacks against the 2-round Even-Mansour construction, using the 3-xor problem [41]: G. Leurent and F. Sibleyras proved that attacking the 2-round Even-Mansour construction with blocksize $n$ is related to the 3-XOR problem with elements on size $2n$. Then, they exhibited the first generic attacks on this construction where both the data and the memory complexity are significantly lower than $2^n$.

• Generic attacks against the tweakable FX-construction [55]: F. Sibleyras exhibited a generic attack on the general tweakable iterated FX-construction, which provides an upper-bound on its security. Most notably, for two rounds, this upper bound matches the proof of the particular case of XHX2 by Lee and Lee at Asiacrypt 2018, thus proving for the first time its tightness.

• Modes for authenticated encryption: Besides the design of new lightweight authenticated encryption schemes, we also analyzed some modes of operation in case of release of unverified plaintext (RUP). Indeed, in this setting, an adversary gets separated access to the decryption and verification functionality, and has more power in breaking the scheme. Our results include a forgery attack against the GCM-RUP mode of operation [54], and the design of a new lightweight deterministic scheme, named ANYDAE, which is particularly efficient for short messages, and achieves both conventional security and RUP security [24].

• Generic attacks on hash combiners [15]: G. Leurent and his co-authors analyzed the security of hash combiners, i.e. of procedures that combine two or more hash functions in a way that is hopefully more secure than each of the underlying hash functions, or at least remains secure as long as one of them is secure. They found generic attacks on the XOR combiner, on the concatenation of two Merkle-Damgård hash functions and on the Zipper hash and on the Hash-Twice combiners when they both use Merkle-Damgård hash constructions.