Section: Research Program

Modelling

Before being able to analyse and properly design security protocols, it is essential to have a model with a precise semantics of the protocols themselves, the attacker and its capabilities, as well as the properties a protocol must ensure.

Most current languages for protocol specification are quite basic and do not provide support for global state, loops, or complex data structures such as lists, or Merkle trees. As an example we may cite Hardware Security Modules that rely on a notion of mutable global state which does not arise in traditional protocols, see e.g. the discussion by Herzog [57].

Similarly, the properties a protocol should satisfy are generally not precisely defined, and stating the “right” definitions is often a challenging task in itself. In the case of authentication, many protocol attacks were due to the lack of a precise meaning, cf. [56]. While the case of authentication has been widely studied, the recent digitalisation of all kinds of transactions and services, introduces a plethora of new properties, including for instance anonymity in e-voting, untraceability of RFID tokens, verifiability of computations that are out-sourced, as well as sanitisation of data in social networks. We expect that many privacy and anonymity properties may be modelled as particular observational equivalences in process calculi [52], or indistinguishability between cryptographic games [2]; sanitisation of data may also rely on information-theoretic measures.

We also need to take into account that the attacker model changes. While historically the attacker was considered to control the communication network, we may nowadays argue that even (part of) the host executing the software may be compromised through, e.g., malware. This situation motivates the use of secure elements and multi-factor authentication with out-of-band channels. A typical example occurs in e-commerce: to validate an online payment a user needs to enter an additional code sent by the bank via SMS to the user's mobile phone. Such protocols require the possession of a physical device in addition to the knowledge of a password which could have been leaked on an untrusted platform. The fact that data needs to be copied by a human requires these data to be short, and hence amenable to brute-force attacks by an attacker or guessing.