Section: Research Program

Attack Resistance

The first two axes of the team allowed us to measure the concrete technical means of the attacker. We claim that the attacker can always avoid the measures put in place to secure a system. We believe that another way to offer more secure systems is to take into account from the design phase that these systems will operate in the presence of an omnipotent attacker. The last research axis of the CIDRE team is focused on offering systems that are resistant to attackers, i.e. they can provide the expected services even in the presence of an attacker.

To achieve this goal, we explore two approaches:

• deceptive security

• malicious behavior tolerance

In the notion of deceptive security we group together all the approaches that aim to mislead the active attacker in a system in order to deceive him on the exact nature of his target. These approaches can slow down the attacker or lead him to abandon his attack.

Finally, we contribute to the design of architectures or services relying on the collaboration of entities that is not affected by the minority presence of malicious entities. These architectures or services are based on the collaboration of a set of nodes that are not affected by the presence in minority of malicious nodes.