Section: Partnerships and Cooperations

National Initiatives

ANR

• ANR programme blanc CPP (“Confidence, Probability, and Proofs”), 2009-April 2013. Partners: LSV (scientific leader), CEA LIST (co-leader), Inria (Comète, Parsifal), Ecole Supérieure d'Electricité (L2S, SSE). External partners: Safran, Dassault Systèmes.

  In the context of proofs of safety properties for critical software, The CPP project proposes to study the joint use of probabilistic and formal (deterministic) semantics and analysis methods, in a way to improve the applicability and precision of static analysis methods on numerical programs. See http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/~bouissou/cpp/index.php .

• ANR VERSO program ProSe (“Proofs of Security”), 2010-2014. Partners: Inria (Cascade, leader; Cassis), LSV, Verimag.

  The goal of the ProSe project is to increase the confidence in security protocols, and in order to reach this goal, provide security proofs at three levels: the symbolic level, in which messages are terms; the computational level, in which messages are bitstrings; and the implementation level: the program itself. This project is a continuation of the FormaCrypt project. See https://crypto.di.ens.fr/projects:prose:main .

• ANR JCJC project VIP, 2012-2015. Awarded to Stéphanie Delaune.

  The aim of this project is to formally analyze modern applications in which privacy plays an important role. Many applications having an important societal impact are concerned by privacy, e.g. electronic voting, electronic auction protocols, RFID tags, safety critical application in vehicular ad hoc networks, routing protocols in mobile ad hoc networks, etc. Moreover, each application comes with its own specificities. E.g. e-voting protocols often rely on complex cryptographic primitives, some routing protocols rely on recursive tests, and so on. In mobile ad hoc networks, taking into account mobility issues is also an important challenge.

  Because security protocols are notoriously difficult to design and analyse, formal verification techniques are extremely important. However, nearly all studies focus on trace-based security properties, and thus to not allow one to analyse privacy-type properties that play an important role in many modern applications. Moreover, the envisioned applications have some specificities that prevent them to be modelled in an accurate way with existing verification tools.

  The goal of this project is to design verification algorithms to analyse privacy-type properties on several applications having an important societal impact. The project is accompanied by an effort in case studies and application domains which will allow at the end of the project an assessment of the pragmatic potential both in terms of modelling and effective analysis. More details are available on the web page of the project: http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/Projects/anr-vip/ .

• Inria-DGA contract, on evaluation of the Orchids tool. This is a 3-year contract, starting in April 2013, on the evaluation and improvement of the Orchids intrusion detection tool. The actual contents of the contract is not public.