Section: New Software and Platforms


Participants : Bruno Blanchet [correspondant] , David Cadé [Sept. 2009–Dec. 2013] .

CryptoVerif (http://cryptoverif.inria.fr) is an automatic protocol prover sound in the computational model. In this model, messages are bitstrings and the adversary is a polynomial-time probabilistic Turing machine. CryptoVerif can prove secrecy and correspondences, which include in particular authentication. It provides a generic mechanism for specifying the security assumptions on cryptographic primitives, which can handle in particular symmetric encryption, message authentication codes, public-key encryption, signatures, hash functions, and Diffie-Hellman key agreements.

The generated proofs are proofs by sequences of games, as used by cryptographers. These proofs are valid for a number of sessions polynomial in the security parameter, in the presence of an active adversary. CryptoVerif can also evaluate the probability of success of an attack against the protocol as a function of the probability of breaking each cryptographic primitive and of the number of sessions (exact security).

CryptoVerif has been used in particular for a study of Kerberos in the computational model, and as a back-end for verifying implementations of protocols in F# and C.

CryptoVerif is freely available on the web, at http://cryptoverif.inria.fr/, under the CeCILL license.