• The Inria's Research Teams produce an annual Activity Report presenting their activities and their results of the year. These reports include the team members, the scientific program, the software developed by the team and the new results of the year. The report also describes the grants, contracts and the activities of dissemination and teaching. Finally, the report gives the list of publications of the year.

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Section: New Results

How to Securely Compute with Noisy Leakage in Quasilinear Complexity

Since their introduction in the late 90’s, side-channel attacks have been considered as a major threat against cryptographic implementations. This threat has raised the need for formal leakage models in which the security of implementations can be proved. At Eurocrypt 2013, Prouff and Rivain introduced the noisy leakage model which has been argued to soundly capture the physical reality of power and electromagnetic leakages. In their work, they also provide the first formal security proof for a masking scheme in the noisy leakage model. However their work has two important limitations: (i) the security proof relies on the existence of a leak-free component, (ii) the tolerated amount of information in the leakage (aka leakage rate) is of $O\left(1/n\right)$ where n is the number of shares in the underlying masking scheme. The first limitation was nicely tackled by Duc, Dziembowski and Faust one year later (Eurocrypt 2014). Their main contribution was to show a security reduction from the noisy leakage model to the conceptually simpler random- probing model. They were then able to prove the security of the well-known Ishai-Sahai-Wagner scheme (Crypto 2003) in the noisy leakage model. The second limitation was addressed last year in a paper by Andrychowicz, Dziembowski and Faust (Eurocrypt 2016). The proposed construction achieves security in the strong adaptive probing model with a leakage rate of $O\left(1/logn\right)$ at the cost of a $O\left({n}^{2}logn\right)$ complexity. we argue that their result can be translated into the noisy leakage model with a leakage rate of $O\left(1\right)$ by using secret sharing based on algebraic geometric codes. They further argue that the efficiency of their construction can be improved by a linear factor using packed secret sharing but no details are provided.

In [14], we show how to compute in the presence of noisy leakage with a leakage rate up to $\stackrel{˜}{O}\left(1\right)$ in complexity $\stackrel{˜}{O}\left(n\right)$. They use a polynomial encoding allowing quasilinear multiplication based on the fast Number Theoretic Transform (NTT). They first show that the scheme is secure in the random-probing model with leakage rate $O\left(1/logn\right)$. Using the reduction by Duc et al. this result can be translated in the noisy leakage model with a $O\left(1/|F{|}^{2}logn\right)$ leakage rate. However, as in the work of Andrychowicz et al. , our construction also requires $|F|=O\left(n\right)$. In order to bypass this issue, we refine the granularity of our computation by considering the noisy leakage model on logical instructions that work on constant-size machine words. we provide a generic security reduction from the noisy leakage model at the logical-instruction level to the random-probing model at the arithmetic level. This reduction allows to prove the security of the construction in the noisy leakage model with leakage rate $\stackrel{˜}{O}\left(1\right)$).