AKISS and SubVariant
Participant : Ştefan Ciobâcă.
AKISS (http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/~ciobaca/akiss/ ) is a tool implementing a procedure for verifying trace equivalence (or equivalently may-testing equivalence) for bounded security processes with no else branches employing cryptographic primitives modeled by an optimally reducing rewrite system.
Trace equivalence can be used to model strong secrecy, vote-privacy and other security properties.
AKISS uses a fully-abstract encoding of symbolic traces into Horn clauses, thereby extending the KISS tool (http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/~ciobaca/kiss/ ), which can only check static equivalence.
In order to get rid of the equational theory modeling the crytographic primitives, AKISS employs algorithms for computing strongly complete sets of variants and complete set of unifiers of the SubVariant tool. AKISS is described in an article submitted to ESOP, in Chapter 5 of Ştefan Ciobâcă's PhD thesis  .
SubVariant (http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/~ciobaca/subvariant/ ) is a tool for computing finite strongly complete set of variants modulo a convergent optimally reducing term rewriting system. SubVariant can also compute complete sets of equational unifiers for equational theories implemented by a convergent optimally reducing term rewriting system.
Complete sets of variants and the finite variant property were introduced in  . In  , Ştefan Ciobâcă defines strongly complete sets of variants, which are more natural and more useful. Chapter 3 in Ştefan Ciobâcă's PhD thesis describes extensively the algorithms behind SubVariant.