Section: Research Program
Distributed Learning in Games and Online Optimization
Participants : Nicolas Gast, Bruno Gaujal, Arnaud Legrand, Patrick Loiseau, Panayotis Mertikopoulos.
Game theory is a thriving interdisciplinary field that studies the interactions between competing optimizing agents, be they humans, firms, bacteria, or computers. As such, game-theoretic models have met with remarkable success when applied to complex systems consisting of interdependent components with vastly different (and often conflicting) objectives – ranging from latency minimization in packet-switched networks to throughput maximization and power control in mobile wireless networks.
In the context of large-scale, decentralized systems (the core focus of the POLARIS project), it is more relevant to take an inductive, “bottom-up” approach to game theory, because the components of a large system cannot be assumed to perform the numerical calculations required to solve a very-large-scale optimization problem. In view of this, POLARIS' overarching objective in this area is to develop novel algorithmic frameworks that offer robust performance guarantees when employed by all interacting decision-makers.
A key challenge here is that most of the literature on learning in games has focused on static games with a finite number of actions per player , . While relatively tractable, such games are ill-suited to practical applications where players pick an action from a continuous space or when their payoff functions evolve over time – this being typically the case in our target applications (e.g., routing in packet-switched networks or energy-efficient throughput maximization in wireless). On the other hand, the framework of online convex optimization typically provides worst-case performance bounds on the learner's regret that the agents can attain irrespectively of how their environment varies over time. However, if the agents' environment is determined chiefly by their interactions these bounds are fairly loose, so more sophisticated convergence criteria should be applied.
From an algorithmic standpoint, a further challenge occurs when players can only observe their own payoffs (or a perturbed version thereof). In this bandit-like setting regret-matching or trial-and-error procedures guarantee convergence to an equilibrium in a weak sense in certain classes of games. However, these results apply exclusively to static, finite games: learning in games with continuous action spaces and/or nonlinear payoff functions cannot be studied within this framework. Furthermore, even in the case of finite games, the complexity of the algorithms described above is not known, so it is impossible to decide a priori which algorithmic scheme can be applied to which application.